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ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: HOW MUCH DOES
THE UNITES STATES REALLY CARE?
INTRODUCTION
Across the globe, international businesses are being accused of massive
human rights violations. Well-known transnational corporations (“TNCs”),
such as Apple, Nike and Hersheys,1 have been publicly charged with taking
advantage of foreign workers, foreign lands, and damaging impoverished
communities in the name of productivity and profit. Despite this poor track
record abroad, few laws, domestic or international, exist to prevent violations.
While the United States has discussed how TNCs can better cope with
violations of human rights, the nation has not taken any steps toward creating
or supporting an enforceable law. This complacent attitude leads one to
question how committed the U.S. is to the legal protection of human rights.
This Perspective will examine the United States' commitment to the
protection of human rights and the discipline TNCs face for violations. It will
begin by addressing international human rights laws and the inherent
complications of enforcement against TNCs. It will then discuss the domestic
laws implemented to combat the human rights violations TNCs commit, as
well as the fallibility of those laws. Specifically, it will discuss the legal failure
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. Lastly, it will conclude with an analysis
regarding the intersection of future international human rights law and the
accountability of TNCs, specifically via an international treaty.
In examining the role the U.S. has played in enforcing human rights against
TNCs, it appears there is an extreme need for legislative action. In sum, the
U.S. should use its regulatory powers to require that TNCs uphold international
human rights policies. However, this regulation strategy creates an
international jurisdictional dilemma. A possible solution is the creation of an
international treaty providing the U.S. jurisdiction over TNCs, regardless of
location, if human rights are violated. Therefore, regardless of domestic or
1

Sabrina Basran, The Impact of Ruggie’s Guiding Principles for Human Rights?, CSRINTERNATIONAL.
(Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.csrinternational.org/the-impact-of-ruggies-guiding-principles-for-humanrights/ (discussing the human rights violations of Apple’s workers in China, Nike’s sweatshop labor in
Vietnam, and Hersheys’ allegations of forced child labor).
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international incorporation, an avenue for justice will exist within the U.S. for
victims of human rights abuses. While the U.S. has not been proactive in
addressing human rights abuses by TNCs, creating forward-thinking laws and
regulations may help prevent future harms.
I. INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND TNCS:
THE RUGGIE FRAMEWORK
In 2011, the United Nations promulgated The UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”), otherwise known as, “the Ruggie
framework2”, in an effort to enhance corporate accountability for human rights
internationally.3 The U.N. published the UNGPs as guidelines, or suggested
best practices, to prevent and protect workers from suffering human rights
violations by their employers.4 The UNGPs are non-binding, and TNCs can
adopt them on a purely voluntary basis.5 These guidelines do not constitute
law, and thus lack an enforceability mechanism. This has led critics to question
the effectiveness of the UNGPs.6 Under international law, corporations have
no “legal personality”, and the U.N. cannot require that TNCs be subject to the
UNGPs.7 However, in the U.S. justice system, corporations are treated as
individuals and can be subject to legal obligations.8 Therefore, the U.S. has the
unique ability to regulate TNCs regarding human rights violations by
mandating compliance with either the Ruggie framework or an alternative, but
comparable, guideline. Still, the U.S. has done no such thing.

2

Id.
UN Guiding Principles, BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CTR., http://business-humanrights.org/en/
un-guiding-principles (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
4 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) (explaining the three main principles of the UNGPs for TNCs as: (1) obligations to
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms; (2) complying with all applicable laws;
and (3) matching appropriate and effective remedies if UNGPs are breached).
5 Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting an
Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 33, at 35 (2012),
http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/48/num1/Blitt33.pdf.
6 Peter Muchlinski, Beyond the Guiding Principles? Examining New Calls for a Legally Binding
Instrument on Business and Human Rights, INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS. (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.
ihrb.org/commentary/beyond-the-guiding-principles.html.
7 Id.
8 Patel v. AT&T, No. 94-B-49, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 330, at *6–7 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1997).
3
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II. THE U.S.’ ROLE IN ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST TNCS
Though the U.S. has not made the framework into law, it has begun to
engage in an organized discourse on how to combat issues of human rights
abuses. Three years after the UNGPs were released, the UN requested that
Member States create National Action Plans (“NAP”) “to promote the
implementation of the UNGPs within their respective national contexts.”9
Rather than forcing nations to comply with specific regulations, the UNGPs
allow each nation to determine how best to proceed with human rights
violations according to each nation’s specific circumstances. The U.S. has
begun the process of developing its own NAP, calling upon stakeholders and
members of the public to contribute their thoughts on how best to “promote
responsible business conduct abroad.”10 Nonetheless, no promise exists
regarding the creation of any enforceable law as a result of this public
engagement.
The most relevant U.S. legislation for the enforcement of human rights
violations is the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).11 The ATS grants U.S. courts
jurisdiction over a complaint of an international law violation, regardless of
violation location or perpetrator citizenship, in an effort to promote and protect
human rights obligations. However, the ATS only permits a “cause of action
for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for
personal liability at the time”.12 Therefore, the statute can only be invoked for
the “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy.”13 “Safe conducts” is never defined in the statute, and “rights of
ambassadors” and “piracy” do not fully encompass the breadth of human rights
violations that may arise. The statute does not address corrupt government
practices, coercion, or any other multitude of human rights violations. Last
updated at its inception, the ATS cannot fully encompass the wide breath of
human rights violations TNCs are committing today.
U.S. courts need broader jurisdiction over human rights violations. One
way to accomplish this is by amending the ATS to include a wider range of
9 National Action Plans, INT’L CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE, http://icar.ngo/initiatives/
national-action-plans/ (last visited Oct. 2 2015).
10 Christopher Smart, Announcement of Opportunity to Provide Input into the U.S. National Action Plan
on Responsible Business Conduct, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014, 1:29 PM), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/blog/2014/11/20/announcement-opportunity-provide-input-us-national-action-plan-responsible-business-.
11 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2012).
12 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
13 Id.
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violations of international human rights law in its jurisdictional scope, and to
extend its jurisdiction to include the actions of TNCs. As previously stated, the
U.S. is in a unique position to enforce laws against corporations, but TNCs
complicate the issue of jurisdiction. TNCs incorporated abroad or committing
human rights violations internationally are not subject to the same regulations
as domestically incorporated companies. When exploring international
relations, the U.S. is more concerned with protecting the rules of sovereignty
and creating positive alliances than actively pursuing jurisdictional challenges
which may arise.14 Therefore, TNCs are often able to escape regulation and
responsibility for human rights violations. While the U.S. has the ability to
become an international leader in enforcing human rights laws against TNCs,
there are currently no laws to enforce, and no statutes to grant jurisdictional
authority.
III. WHEN DOMESTIC LAW IN THE U.S. FAILS
To demonstrate how real and problematic human rights issues involving
TNCs are, consider Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.15 In this 2013 case,
Nigerian nationals, granted asylum in the U.S., filed suit in the U.S. against
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (“RDPC”) and Shell Transport and Trading
Company (“Shell”). These companies are incorporated in the Netherlands and
England, respectively.16 The Nigerian nationals alleged that the Shell
Petroleum Development Company (“SPDC”), incorporated in Nigeria as a
joint subsidiary of the former two companies, caused gross environmental
harm to the land.17 They further alleged that, when locals began protesting the
harm, the SPDC conspired with the Nigerian government to suppress the
locals, condoning and encouraging the use of violent and, in some cases, fatal
force.18 The petitioners alleged that RDPC and Shell “aided and abetted” these
crimes by supporting the SPDC as a subsidiary.19 The Second Circuit
dismissed the petitioners’ complaint on the grounds that “the law of nations
does not recognize corporate liability.”20 This was to be expected, considering

14
15

16
17
18
19
20

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro Co. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013).
Id. at 1659.
Id. at 1662.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1662–63.
Id. at 1663.
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that the current framework of human rights law, internationally and in the U.S.,
does not treat corporations as legal entities.21
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Writ of Certiorari, requesting that the
parties argue the issue of: “whether and under what circumstances the [Alien
Tort Statute] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.”22 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the ATS did not
grant the U.S. jurisdiction.23 The ATS did not apply, as the complaint did not
fall within one of the three originally contemplated categories for violations of
international law.24 Additionally, the Court wished to avoid an issue of
sovereignty; none of the parties involved were U.S. citizens, the companies
were not incorporated domestically, and the alleged crimes occurred on foreign
soil.25 There is a presumption against extraterritorial application of a statute
unless Congress indicates otherwise, and the ATS lacks explicit indication of
Congress’ intention to apply it to the circumstances presented.26 Federal courts
are limited “to recognizing causes of action only for alleged violations of
international law norms that are ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’.”27 There
is no universal, international law requiring TNCs to protect human rights. The
case was dismissed, and the victims of the alleged abuse were left without
redress in the U.S.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD: TNC ENFORCEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
It is clear that the current international framework does not provide
enforceable regulations for TNCs. However, there is hope for the future. The
United Nations Human Rights Council is attempting to create a treaty
“imposing international human rights legal obligations on transnational
corporations.”28 The treaty would create enforceable laws regulating the
actions of TNCs by enforcing the fundamental human rights of their employees
21

Muchlinski, supra note 6.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. (quoting Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petro Co., 182 L. E. 2d. 270 (2012)).
23 Kiobel, at 1667-68.
24 Id.
25 Kiobel at 1664.
26 Id. (quoting Morrison v. Australian National Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)).
27 Id. at 1665 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (1994)).
28 In Controversial Landmark Resolution, Human Rights Council Takes First Step Toward Treaty on
Transnational Corporations’ Human Rights Obligations, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CTR. (July 15, 2014),
http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/07/15/in-controversial-landmark-resolution-human-rights-council-takes-firststep-toward-treaty-on-transnational-corporations-human-rights-obligations/.
22
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and persons with whom they may come in contact.29 However, the treaty
would not absolve nations of the duty to pass laws to protect victims of
corporate human rights violations.30 If this treaty comes to fruition, perhaps
victims would be able to bring claims for compensation and redress of
grievances in the U.S. or abroad.
If the U.S. adopted such a treaty, it would require TNCs to implement
specific protocol to prevent human rights abuses. TNCs would be held legally
accountable for human rights violations in a way that is unprecedented. Private
companies would likely be required to hire human rights consultants and
supervisors to create specific policies and ensure their compliance. Failure may
result in a cause of action, providing redress for victims. Regardless,
jurisdictional issues may plague such a treaty and create implementation
problems. The treaty would need to specifically state that the U.S. jurisdiction
would extend to any violations of international law, to offset the limitation of
U.S. federal courts “recognizing causes of action only for alleged violations of
international law norms that are ‘specific, universal, and obligatory.”31 Human
rights laws should be universal, and could be, if the U.S. adopted a treaty.
However, this prospect seems unattainable considering the following state
of affairs. At the request of the Human Rights Council, Member States were
asked to vote on whether they should establish a working group to develop a
business and human rights treaty.32 The U.S. voted against the working
group.33 It would seem, with an understanding of how paralyzed the U.S.
courts are in dealing with TNCs and human rights violations, that the U.S.
would want to work on establishing enforceable laws that would allow for
victim redress. This contradiction in intention and behavior leads one to
question the U.S.’s position regarding the protection of human rights.
Further exploration into this area is necessary to understand why exactly
the U.S. voted against it. In fact, most Member States either abstained or voted
against the proposal.34 Do other countries have the same issues the U.S. does in
their inability to enforce human rights obligations against TNCs? Do other
countries have statutes similar to the ATS, but allow for a wider application?
29

Id.
Id.
31 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.
32 In Controversial Landmark Resolution, Human Rights Council Takes First Step Toward Treaty on
Transnational Corporations’ Human Rights Obligations, supra note 28.
33 Id.
34 Id.
30
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Surely, each Member State wants to protect its own interests in this matter, and
signing an international treaty may force concessions.
The U.S. may think its NAP serves as an effective substitute for signing the
treaty. However, in order for the U.S. to enforce human rights, it requires
enforceable law. This treaty seems to be the next logical step on the path
towards protection human rights against TNCs. Considering the current
powerlessness of the U.S. courts to address issues such as Kiobel, one must
question how genuinely concerned the U.S. is about the enforcement of human
rights violations against TNCs.
MADELINE KAHN
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